How did Shushi fall, why did the defense of Shushi fail, who was responsible for the loss of Shushi, and how did it eventually become known that the city was no longer under Armenian control?

The fall of Shushi once again showed that we are not in the habit of learning “lessons” from history.

The events that happened about 102 years ago from the fall of Shushi seemed like a good lesson for us that we learned, but alas, this is not so.

Western Armenian TV presents another unheeded history lesson that became fateful for our nation.

At the end of January 1918, after the fall of Erznka, the Turkish army occupied the areas previously controlled by the Russian army one after another and moved towards Karin.

The powerful fortress city, considered the key to Turkish Armenia, was captured by a 25,000-strong Russian army in early February 1916.

In February 1918, several Armenian military units, a large number of refugees, and Armenian forces retreating from Yerznka and other places concentrated in Karin.

At the beginning of February, Andranik was sent to Karin, soon joined by various volunteer detachments, consisting mainly of Western Armenians.

The internal state of the city was unstable: the general mood of retreat, the demoralization of the troops, the lack of central leadership and command undermined the defense capability.

In addition, there were about 25 thousand fairly well-armed Turks in Karina, who were eagerly awaiting the army of Vehib Pasha.

Writer Vahan Totovents, who participated in hostilities as part of Andranik’s military units, describes the situation in Erzurum in his book “Commander Andranik and His Wars.”

“Here was the Armenian Committee of Moscow with its authority.

It was a semi-political body, since for several years it finally operated in Carnot and acquired a credit with warehouses and weapons.

Here was the National Council, here was the Security Council of Armenia, trading with its regiment and double post.

Odishelidze with his latest reputation.

Murad’s officers, Khi regiment, Berber regiment.

All this in arguing and fighting with each other, each of whom did not like each other.”

Totovents writes that in Karin there were “various and amazing authorities, regiments, Ash’arites,

autocrats.”

He speaks especially negatively about Tigran Aghamalyan, who “was a warlord who had the ruthlessness of interfering in military affairs.

This person had various positions: governor of the Karna district, commissioner of the Karna district, chairman of the branch of the Karna National Council, etc.”

According to various sources, Tigran Aghamalyan was engaged in the sale of weapons and other goods.

In his memoirs, Aram Amirkhanyan writes, “They said about Aghamalyan that he sold 75 boxes of Mosin rifles and 60,000 cartridges to the Turks.”

In shady financial matters, Aghamalyan collaborated with General Odishelidze, who had already left Karin in those days.

Totovents writes that Odishelidze took 5 million rubles with him.

Aghamalyan begins to turn the soldiers in Karina against Andranik, saying that they should not obey the orders of such a non-military man as Andranik.

To be continued…

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