From the Vilayet Reforms to Sèvres, followed by the retreat of 1920–1923
A Historical, Diplomatic, and Legal Study

I. An Important Clarification: Boghos Nubar Was Not the Initiator of the “Western Armenia” Project

The political project to which Boghos Nubar devoted his activities did not begin with him. It was the continuation of an earlier diplomatic history that contributed to strengthening the Western Armenia project.

Article 61 of the 1878 Treaty of Berlin → Armenian Reforms of 1912–1914 → Armenian National Delegation → Diplomatic activity during the First World War → Paris Peace Conference → United Armenia → Treaty of Sèvres → Wilsonian Arbitration.

The Armenian National Delegation was established in 1912, when the Great Powers once again placed the issue of reforms in the eastern provinces of the Ottoman Empire on their agenda. Catholicos of All Armenians Gevorg V appointed Boghos Nubar as head of the delegation, and he established himself in Paris at the end of 1912.

Therefore, two circumstances must be distinguished:

• the historical and political demands of the Armenians of the Armenian provinces of the Ottoman Empire;
• Boghos Nubar’s personal diplomatic strategy, which created new opportunities for those demands among European governments.

This is precisely where his significance lies.

II. Why Was Boghos Nubar Particularly Suited to This Mission?

His personal background was exceptional.

The son of former Egyptian Prime Minister Nubar Pasha, Boghos Nubar was educated in France and Switzerland and graduated from the École Centrale in 1873 with an engineering qualification. He later held important positions in Egypt’s railway system and belonged to the Egyptian-Armenian elite, which maintained close ties with European economic and political circles.

Therefore, he did not come from traditional diplomacy. His advantage was of a different nature:

economic capital + European networks + administrative experience + family prestige + Armenian philanthropic activity.

The founding of the Armenian General Benevolent Union (AGBU) in 1906 was an important milestone. Together with other prominent Armenian figures in Egypt, Boghos Nubar established the organization in the context of the Armenian massacres that had taken place at the end of the nineteenth century. It later provided him with an international network and experience in cross-border organizational work.

Thus, even before 1912, he already possessed the social and financial infrastructure necessary for international activity.

III. 1912: The True Beginning of the Diplomatic Project

The institutional starting point was 1912.

Gevorg V entrusted Boghos Nubar with the leadership of the Armenian National Delegation.

His initial mission was not yet to demand an independent Armenian state directly. The main objective was to demand that the Great Powers compel the Ottoman Empire to implement Armenian reforms, which stemmed in particular from Article 61 of the Treaty of Berlin, in the context of the continuation of Article 16 of the Treaty of San Stefano.

This is an important circumstance for understanding subsequent developments.

Between 1912 and 1914, Boghos Nubar was still operating within the framework of the international reform of the Ottoman Empire.

He did not begin with the demand:

“We want to destroy the Ottoman Empire.”

He began with the demand:

“International obligations concerning the protection of the Armenian population must be implemented.”

This strategy was far more acceptable to European diplomacy.

IV. How Did Boghos Nubar Turn the Demand into an International Issue?

He employed a method that was remarkably modern for his time.

1. He built a network

Boghos Nubar made numerous trips to:

• Paris,
• London,
• Berlin,
• Geneva.

In London, he gained the support of British circles sympathetic to the Armenian Question and maintained contacts with officials of the Foreign Office, including Edward Grey.

He did not limit himself to submitting petitions. He sought to create a politically favorable environment for the Armenian Question.

2. He worked with diplomats rather than against them

This was one of the important characteristics of his method.

In 1913, he actively participated in negotiations concerning the reform project for the Armenian provinces.

The final compromise reached in February 1914 provided for the establishment of two administrative units in Anatolia, which were to be supervised by two European inspectors.

The appointed inspectors were the Dutchman Louis Constant Westenenk and the Norwegian Nicolai Hoff.

The plan, however, was never implemented because the Ottoman Empire entered the war.

Nevertheless, this represented an important diplomatic success. For the first time since the Treaty of Berlin, the issue of governing the Armenian provinces had been transformed into a concrete international mechanism.

V. 1915 Completely Changes the Nature of the Project

This is where the turning point occurs.

The reform project was pushed into the background as a result of the physical destruction of a large part of the Armenian population of the Ottoman Empire.

Boghos Nubar understood that the issue was no longer merely how to obtain reforms, but how to ensure the survival of the Armenian people.

The Armenian National Delegation gradually became a wartime diplomatic instrument.

In 1915, Boghos Nubar was also involved in organizing assistance for those affected by the catastrophe.

The territorial question now acquired a new significance.

VI. 1916: Boghos Nubar Understands That Armenians Must Become the Allies’ Military Partners

This is one of the most important and often incompletely understood episodes of his activity.

Boghos Nubar did not merely want the Allies to sympathize with the Armenians. He wanted the Armenians to become military partners of the Allies.

For this purpose, the plan to establish the Eastern Legion was proposed.

Negotiations with France and Great Britain lasted approximately two years, from 1914 to 1916. The objective was to involve Armenians in military operations and thereby strengthen their position in the post-war territorial settlement.

On October 27, 1916, an agreement on the creation of the Eastern Legion was reached in London, and the Legion was established on November 15, 1916.

The formation was organized under French supervision and consisted mainly of Armenian refugees from the Ottoman Empire.

In November 1918, it was officially renamed the Armenian Legion, and on February 1, 1919, its status was formally confirmed.

This represented a fundamental change.

Boghos Nubar sought to transform the following relationship:

victim → protected

into:

victim → ally → partner → beneficiary of the territorial settlement.

From a diplomatic perspective, this was a modern strategy.

VII. Yet an Ambiguity Already Existed: Cilicia or Western Armenia?

Here, it is necessary to avoid a frequently encountered confusion.

Boghos Nubar supported several territorial projects that were not entirely identical.

1. Reform project for the eastern vilayets

• Erzurum (Karin),
• Van,
• Bitlis,
• Diyarbakir (Tigranakert),
• Kharberd,
• Sebastia,

with the question of Trebizond also added.

2. The United Armenia project

It included:

• the Republic of Armenia in the Caucasus,
• the Armenian territories of the Ottoman Empire,
• and, in some formulations, Cilicia as well.

3. The Cilician project

Boghos Nubar also sought autonomy for Cilicia or the status of a national homeland under French protection.

This diversity is important for understanding subsequent developments.

VIII. 1919: The Peak of Boghos Nubar’s Diplomatic Influence

After the war, Boghos Nubar arrived in Paris with an exceptional advantage: the Allies had won, the Ottoman Empire had been defeated, and the question of the Ottoman territories had to be settled.

The Armenians could present their demands as an issue connected simultaneously with several circumstances:

• previous international obligations,
• the Armenian massacres,
• military sacrifices,
• new post-war principles,
• the need for a stable political settlement.

However, one problem immediately emerged: there were now two Armenian representations.

The Armenian National Delegation, headed by Boghos Nubar.

It mainly represented Armenians of the former Ottoman Empire—the Armenians of Western Armenia and the Armenian diaspora.

The Delegation of the Republic of Armenia, headed by Avetis Aharonian.

It represented the Republic of Armenia in the Caucasus.

Nevertheless, the two delegations were able to cooperate. Their representatives jointly prepared a memorandum on the Armenian Question, which was presented to the Peace Conference.

At that time, the two delegations demanded a territory that included the Armenian territories of the Caucasus, the six vilayets of Western Armenia and access to the Black Sea, as well as Cilicia.

IX. February 26, 1919: Boghos Nubar Enters the Diplomatic Arena of the Great Powers

The Council of Ten agreed to hear the Armenian delegation.

Nubar and Aharonian jointly presented their memorandum.

This was an important moment.

However, an important distinction must immediately be made:

Being heard by the Council of Ten did not mean that the Armenians had become members of the Council of Ten.

The Armenians did not have the place reserved for representatives of sovereign states at the table where decisions were made.

This was one of the first structural limitations of Nubar’s diplomacy.

He could persuade.

He could argue.

He could influence.

But he had no right to vote.

X. Why Did He Nevertheless Become a Key Figure?

Because he gradually became the principal non-state representative of the Armenian Question.

His significance resulted from a combination of several factors.

First, he had a European diplomatic network.

Second, he represented an already established Armenian institution.

Third, he possessed financial and organizational resources.

Fourth, he was perceived as a moderate and diplomatically acceptable interlocutor.

Fifth, he had a network of committees supporting the Armenian Question.

Sixth, he was able to present Armenians as partners of the Allies.

Seventh, when Armenian unity was important, he cooperated with Aharonian when necessary.

The delegation’s archives demonstrate the scale of this activity: correspondence from 1913–1921, files concerning personnel and missions, records, private representations, and diplomatic documents.

XI. 1920: The High Point

The high point was marked by three events.

1. Recognition of the Republic of Armenia by the Allies

This occurred in January 1920.

2. San Remo

The question of the Ottoman settlement was incorporated into the international system.

3. The Treaty of Sèvres

The Treaty of Sèvres of August 10, 1920, recognized Armenia as an independent state.

And, in particular:

Article 89

The question of the borders between Turkey and Armenia was submitted to arbitration by the President of the United States.

Wilson’s arbitral award was issued on November 22, 1920.

The U.S. Department of State preserved the text of this decision and its legal context: on April 26, 1920, at San Remo, the Supreme Council invited Wilson to determine by arbitration the border between Turkey and Armenia, while the Treaty of Sèvres provided for the acceptance of that arbitration.

It was at this point that Boghos Nubar’s diplomatic activity reached its peak.

XII. However, the Treaty of Sèvres Was Not Boghos Nubar’s Personal Victory

Here, it is necessary to be very precise.

The Treaty of Sèvres was not the result of Armenian diplomacy alone.

It was shaped by a combination of factors:

• the defeat of the Ottoman Empire,
• British policy,
• French policy,
• Italian policy,
• American policy,
• the Greek question,
• the Kurdish question,
• oil interests,
• Franco-British rivalry,
• the situation in Russia,
• the Turkish national movement,
• Armenian diplomacy.

Therefore, Boghos Nubar played an important role in formulating, defending, and internationalizing Armenian demands, but he did not control the decisions of the Great Powers.

This distinction makes it possible to avoid excessive mythologization of his personality.

XIII. Why Did the Allies Later Change Their Position?

This is where the issue becomes particularly interesting.

I would not simply call it “the abandonment of Boghos Nubar.”

It would be more accurate to speak of the collapse of the international coalition that had made the Treaty of Sèvres possible.

Several factors were operating simultaneously.

1. The Republic of Armenia collapses

In November 1920, the Republic of Armenia in the Caucasus was Sovietized.

This completely changed the geopolitical calculation.

The potential core of the future United Armenia envisioned by the Allies was now under Soviet control.

Nevertheless, Boghos Nubar continued to defend the implementation of the provisions concerning the Armenians of the Ottoman Empire.

But his political argument had now become much more difficult to defend.

XIV. The Kemalist Military Victory Changes Everything

Mustafa Kemal’s movement was no longer merely a rebellion.

It had developed into a military force.

In the autumn of 1920, Kemalist forces won the war against Armenia.

At the same time, relations between Ankara and Moscow were developing.

Under these circumstances, the Allies faced a choice between two policies: maintaining the Treaty of Sèvres in its entirety or negotiating with the Kemalist movement.

They gradually chose the second option.

XV. France Was the Most Important Example

France had particularly close relations with Boghos Nubar because of the issues of Cilicia and the Armenian Legion.

However, the French military situation in Cilicia became extremely difficult.

France began seeking an agreement with Ankara.

This created a fundamental break with Boghos Nubar’s project.

One French official source from December 1920 is particularly noteworthy: relying on its archives, the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated that France had made no official commitment guaranteeing autonomy for Cilicia under French protection in exchange for the Armenian Legion.

This circumstance demonstrates how contested the political promises or assurances of 1916 had become after the end of the war.

XVI. Italy and Great Britain Also Changed Their Calculations

After 1920, the Allied Powers were no longer as united as they had been in 1919.

Their common interest against the Ottoman Empire was gradually disappearing.

Other issues came to the forefront:

• colonial rivalries,
• economic interests,
• the oil question,
• the security of Mesopotamia,
• concerns over the Bolshevik threat,
• negotiations with Ankara,
• military exhaustion,
• the cost of another war.

The Armenian Question gradually became secondary within the broader strategy of the powers.

This is probably the main key to understanding the failure of Boghos Nubar’s diplomacy.

XVII. 1921: The London Conference

Here, the transformation of international diplomacy can be seen almost experimentally.

Boghos Nubar and Aharonian once again acted together.

They demanded the preservation of the provisions of the Treaty of Sèvres concerning Armenia and autonomy for Cilicia.

However, the balance of power had already changed.

The Armenian delegations did not obtain the outcome they expected.

The discussions resulted in a much more limited concept: the establishment of an Armenian “National Home” along Turkey’s eastern borders rather than the Armenia envisaged under the Treaty of Sèvres.

This change is important.

It demonstrates that the Allies were no longer speaking the same language as they had in 1919–1920.

XVIII. The Paradox of Boghos Nubar

This is probably the most important conclusion of the study.

Boghos Nubar succeeded in taking the Armenian Question:

from a communal issue → to a diplomatic issue → to an international issue → to a treaty-based issue.

However, he was never able to cross the final threshold: transforming diplomatic recognition into an independent capacity to implement it.

This was the structural limitation of his activity.

XIX. Why Was Boghos Nubar Unable to Prevent the Retreat?

Because he did not possess the following instruments.

A sufficiently powerful state army.

The Armenian Legion was an auxiliary and limited force.

A permanent patron state.

France had its own interests.

A long-term alliance among the Great Powers.

That unity disappeared after 1920.

Territorial control.

Diplomacy was insufficient to establish control over the territories being claimed.

Independent financial and military capacity.

Boghos Nubar possessed significant connections and resources, but not the military and political instruments characteristic of a sovereign state.

XX. Another Fundamental Question: Did Boghos Nubar Represent Western Armenia?

The answer must be more nuanced.

Yes—in an important part of his political mandate.

The Armenian National Delegation had been created specifically to defend the interests of Armenians of the Ottoman Empire in the context of the eastern provinces and the reform question.

However, in legal terms, Boghos Nubar did not represent a sovereign state of Western Armenia.

He was the President of the Armenian National Delegation.

This does not diminish his historical significance in any way.

On the contrary, it allows us to understand the nature of his activity more clearly:

Boghos Nubar conducted national diplomacy without possessing full state sovereignty.

This is precisely what makes his activity particularly interesting for our contemporary study of peoples, self-determination, and indigeneity.

XXI. Boghos Nubar and the Concept of “Representation”

Boghos Nubar’s activity demonstrates that, at the beginning of the twentieth century, a people without a state could:

• establish a delegation,
• obtain political recognition,
• submit memoranda,
• negotiate with governments,
• participate in conferences,
• gain an audience with the Great Powers,
• contribute to the formulation of a treaty,
• have its demands incorporated into an international document.

This represents an important historical precedent.

However, his activity also demonstrates the limitations of such diplomacy.

XXII. 1921–1923: Boghos Nubar’s Departure

In June 1921, Boghos Nubar stepped down as President of the Armenian National Delegation.

He was succeeded by Gabriel Noradounghian.

According to sources, by that time he was disappointed and ill.

Nevertheless, the delegation continued its activities until 1925.

The Lausanne Conference ultimately did not give the Armenians the position they had held within the diplomatic framework of Sèvres.

The Armenian Question was now largely treated as an issue of minorities and refugees rather than one of international territorial settlement.

XXIII. The Final Historical Paradox

1912
Nubar demands: international reforms.

1915–1916
He demands: protection and territory.

1919
He demands: United Armenia.

1920
Sèvres recognizes: an independent Armenia and provides for border arbitration.

November 1920
Wilson’s arbitral award is issued.

1921
The Allies are already speaking of a “National Home.”

1923
Lausanne establishes a different international framework.

XXIV. Why Is This History Important Today?

The lesson of Boghos Nubar’s story should not be reduced to the following formulation: “The Allies betrayed the Armenians.”

Historically, this formulation is overly simplistic.

The real lesson is much deeper:

A national demand can gain international recognition when the interests of the Great Powers coincide with that demand, but such recognition remains extremely vulnerable if it is not accompanied by the institutional, military, and political mechanisms necessary for its implementation.

This is probably why Boghos Nubar is simultaneously:

an example of one of the greatest successes of twentieth-century Armenian diplomacy

and

one of the most painful examples of the limitations of the diplomacy of a people without sovereign power.

Today, under conditions in which entire sovereign territories, including Artsakh, are being transferred to Azerbaijan, the Republic of Armenia in the Caucasus, having been transformed through political changes into the present-day Republic of Armenia without officially recognized borders, is gradually reducing its sovereign capacity and, consequently, its ability to exercise its right to existence.

Armenag Aprahamian
President of the National Council of Western Armenia