Political journalist Hakob Badalyan referred to the French Senate. Badalyan writes:
“On January 17, the French Senate will discuss a resolution aimed at condemning Baku’s aggression towards Artsakh, as well as preventing possible aggression towards Armenia, possible encroachment on territorial integrity.
Undoubtedly, this important cross-party initiative of the French Senate should be welcomed and evaluated positively.
At the same time, we should not forget that the two chambers of the French Parliament twice adopted key resolutions related to Artsakh in the three-year period after the 44-day war.
In November 2020, the French Parliament adopted a resolution calling on official Paris to recognize the independence of Artsakh, recording the borders as of the 1994 ceasefire.
In the fall of 2022, the two chambers of the French Parliament again adopted resolutions aimed at protecting the people and rights of people of Artsakh, establishing sanctions towards Baku in case of aggression. France should promote the idea of applying sanctions in the European Union as well.
However, those resolutions of the French parliament remained at the “advisory” level, and the executive power declared that they were the initiatives of the parliamentarians and did not reflect the official policy of the French government.
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To say that these parliamentary initiatives were “independent” from the official Paris would probably be a fallacy. At the same time, it is beyond doubt that they were a tool, a playing card of the geopolitical game for official Paris.
At least for now, their need has not arisen, and moreover, for example, about 20 days before the Azerbaijani aggression towards Artsakh, the president of the French oil and gas giant of Total Energy was discussing multi-billion investment issues with Ilham Aliyev.
At the end of September, Azerbaijan subjected Artsakh to aggression and ethnic cleansing, the deportation of Armenians, but France never resorted to sanctions and did not try to advance this idea in the European Union, contenting only with statements of condemning what happened in Artsakh.
Thus, the background testifies that the adoption of a new resolution in the French Senate against Baku cannot be considered an effective mechanism to prevent any possible provocation by Azerbaijan towards Armenia.
In that sense, several dozens of French Bastion armored vehicles containing even quite contradictory evaluations are much more subjective than the adoption of several dozen resolutions in the French Parliament.
Those initiatives are welcoming and encouraging, and in the end, the French Senate naturally serves the state interest and interest of France, and there is even a paradox: the French parliament is even more active and zealous than the parliament of the Republic of Armenia in the Artsakh issue.
Nevertheless, another resolution in the French Senate should not become another wave of illusion in Armenia. Moreover, perhaps there is a need for the friendly potential of the French Senate in terms of the Armenian-French relationship to be used at the level of the executive power to further objectify and deepen the Armenian-French cooperation.
